Florida v. Long: Clarification of Retroactive Relief in Title VII Pension Cases by Baxter, Linda K.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 67 Issue 2 
January 1989 
Florida v. Long: Clarification of Retroactive Relief in Title VII 
Pension Cases 
Linda K. Baxter 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Linda K. Baxter, Florida v. Long: Clarification of Retroactive Relief in Title VII Pension Cases, 67 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 643 (1989). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/15 
This Recent Development is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University 
Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
FLORIDA V. LONG: CLARIFICATION OF RETROACTIVE RELIEF IN
TITLE VI PENSION CASES
Florida v. Long' represents the latest Supreme Court decision in a se-
ries of cases2 brought under Title V113 to challenge the use of sex-based
actuarial tables in pension plans. Significantly, Long is the first decision
in which a majority of the Court clearly agreed on both the issues of
liability for the payment of "unequal benefits" and implementation of
retroactive relief.4 The Court determined that Arizona Governing Com-
mittee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Nor-
ris,' and not Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,6
placed pension fund administrators on notice that unequal benefits de-
rived from sex-based actuarial tables violate Title VII.7 The Court also
found that an order requiring increased future benefits to pre-Norris retir-
ees is essentially retroactive because it "disrupt[s] past pension funding
1. 108 S. Ct. 2354 (1988).
2. Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris,
463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (per curiam); Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978).
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). The sub-
stantive prohibition against sex discrimination is found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin....
Title VII applies to all employers in the United States with fifteen or more employees. Title VII also
applies to United States citizens employed by domestic companies operating in foreign countries. J.
MAMORSKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: ERISA AND BEYOND § 11.02 (rev. 1988).
Title VII provides that when a court finds unlawful discrimination it "may enjoin [the discrimina-
tion] . . . and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement.., with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
4. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice's White, O'Connor, and Scalia joined. Norris was also an unequal benefits case which osten-
sibly decided the same issues as the Long Court. However, the Norris Court was "closely divided"
in a confusing per curiam decision. Long, 108 S. Ct. at 2361. The Manhart court expressly limited
its holding to unequal contribution cases. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717-18.
In an unequal benefits case, the plaintiffs periodic benefits are less than those of some other group,
even though the same contributions to the pension fund were made for each employee. In an une-
qual contribution case, plaintiffs receive the same periodic benefits as everyone else, but must con-
tribute more of their pay to the fund than another group.
5. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (per curiam).
6. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
7. Florida v. Long, 108 S. Ct. 2354, 2359-61 (1988).
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assumptions."' Finally, turning to the facts of the case, the Court denied
retroactive relief to the plaintiff, finding that the financial and legal con-
sequences for the employer would be inequitable.9 Long's significance for
state and local pension plans is best highlighted by a discussion of the
Manhart-Norris line of cases.
In Manhart, the employer made equal periodic payments to retired
employees yet required female employees to make larger contributions to
its pension fund than male employees. Based on mortality tables, the
employer determined that women, as a class, live longer than men and
therefore the average total cost of a female's pension benefits is greater.
To counteract this difference, the employer required female employees to
make contributions that were 14.84% greater than those required by
male employees, thereby reducing the female employees' take-home pay
by a proportionate amount." The plan itself was an employer-adminis-
tered, 11 contributory, 2 defined contribution plan 3 in which yearly con-
tributions are fixed but the retiree's periodic benefit is not calculated until
retirement. 14
The Court determined that the primary purpose of Title VII is to pro-
tect individuals, not a stereotypical class. Therefore, even though women
8. Id. at 2364.
9. Id. Generally, Title VII cases employ a presumption in favor of retroactive relief. See
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (Title VII case awarding back pay). How-
ever, the Court has carved out a group of cases in which the Albemarle presumption does not apply.
Title VII pension cases fall within this group. See, eg., Manhart, 435 U.S. at 723 (lower court erred
in granting retroactive relief).
10. 435 U.S. at 704-05.
11. Id. at 705. Many employers have pension plans which are administered by a third party
insurance company. Because the Title VII prohibition against sex discrimination only applies in the
employer-employee context, this distinction is important. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
12. 435 U.S. at 705. A contributory plan is one that provides for employee contributions in
addition to the employer's contributions. A noncontributory plan is one in which all contributions
are made by the employer. G. BOREN, QUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS; § 1:13
(1983 & Supp. 1988); Hager & Zimpleman, The Norris Decision, Its Implications and Application, 32
DRAKE L. Rlv. 913, 919 n.38 (1982-83).
13. A defined contribution plan is one in which employer contributions are allocated to individ-
ual accounts for each participating employee. Each employee's benefit is determined solely on his
account balance at retirement. G. BOREN, supra note 12, § 1:16, at 33; J. MAMORSKY, supra note 3,
§ 8.03, at 8-6; Hager & Zimpleman, supra note 12, at 916 n.14, 934.
14. By contrast, Long involved defined benefit plans. A defined benefit plan is one that provides
benefits according to a predetermined formula. Employer contributions are computed each year
based upon an actuarial estimate of how much must be contributed over the working years of all
employees in order to fund their expected benefits. Employer contributions are not allocated to
individual employee accounts. See G. BOREN, supra note 12, § 1:16, at 33; J. MAMORSKY, supra
note 3, §§ 1.03, 8.03, at 1-9, 8-6.
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as a class live longer than men, to require female employees to make
larger contributions to the pension fund than males violates Title VII
because some women will live shorter lives than the average man. 15
The Court noted, however, that it did not intend to "revolutionize the
insurance and pension industries" and expressly limited its holding to
"unequal contributions to an employer-operated pension fund."16 Fur-
thermore, the Court created what later became known as the "open mar-
ket" exception by leaving open the possibility that employers could
comply with Title VII when the sex-differentiated benefits are created in
the marketplace.17 Finally, the Court limited the award to prospective
relief because prior to Manhart employers could have assumed that use
of sex-based actuarial tables was lawful because"8 retroactive relief was
unnecessary to enforce Title VII, 9 and because the economic impact vis-
ited on insurance and pension plans as a result of retroactive relief could
be drastic. 20
Manhart's express limitations and caveats left many unanswered ques-
tions regarding the use of sex-based actuarial tables in retirement plans.21
As one court observed, "the courts have been baffled by the problem that
Manhart presented. '22 The issues left unanswered included: whether Ti-
tle VII prohibits unequal benefit payments when contributions are
equal; 23 whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act24 exempts certain types of
15. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978).
16. Id. at 717.
17. Id. at 717-18. More specifically, the Court stated that, "Nothing in our holding implies that
it would be unlawful for an employer to set aside equal retirement contributions for each employee
and let each retiree purchase the largest benefit which his or her accumulated contributions could
command in the open market." Id. (footnote omitted). See also Hager & Zimpleman, supra note 12,
at 922-23, for further discussion of the open market exception.
18. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 720.
19. Id. at 720-21.
20. Id. at 721.
21. J. MAMORSKY, supra note 3, § 11.03[3][a]; G. BoREN, supra note 12, § 5:22.
22. Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 566 F. Supp. 1166, 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Sobel court noted
that private insurance companies are unwilling to pay women the same monthly benefit for the same
premium as men "because they know that sound actuarial principles require a real and substantial
distinction." Id. However, the court further noted that Manhart had been interpreted by some
courts as prohibiting any sex-based differences in employer-provided group insurance. Id. at 1190-
92.
23. This is the specific issue decided five years later in Norris. Post-Manhart and pre-Norris
cases varied widely on this issue. See, eg., Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691 F.2d 235, 241 (6th Cir.
1982) (plan relying on sex-based tables and providing unequal benefit payments but equal actuarial
value of total expected payments did not violate Title VII); Sobel, 566 F. Supp. at 1192 (relying on
Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982) to find the use of sex-based
1989]
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funds from Title VII requirements;2" whether Manhart applies to defined
benefit plans;2 6 whether employers can offer different retirement options,
some of which use sex-based actuarial tables and some of which do not;27
and the proper use of retroactive relief.28
The Supreme Court answered many of these questions five years later
in Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris,29 the first unequal benefits case heard by
the Court. In Norris, the employer administered an employee-funded de-
fined contribution plan. Several insurance companies were selected by
the employer to participate in the plan, most offering at least three pay-
ment options. The most popular options were lifetime annuities provid-
ing monthly payments on the basis of sex-differentiated mortality
tables.30 As a result, women who contributed the same amount as simi-
actuarial tables violated Title VII, but expressing doubts about the long-term validity of the Spirt
decision); Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1061 (2d Cir. 1982) (unequal
benefits derived from sex-based actuarial tables prohibited by Manhart); EEOC v. Colby College,
589 F.2d 1139, 1146 (1st Cir. 1978) (Coffin, J., concurring) ("not sure that Manhart held that an
employer could never offer a benefit plan using sex-based tables"). See also G. BOREN, supra note
12, § 5:22; Hager & Zimpleman, supra note 12, at 914 (Manhart created "confusion and
ambiguity").
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982). The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "[n]o Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supercede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... unless such Act specifically relates to the business
of insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982).
25. See, eg., J. MAMORSKY, supra note 3, § 11.03[3][a] (annuity company assuming risk of
mortality not exempt from Title VII under McCarran-Ferguson Act); Hager & Zimpleman, supra
note 12, at 928-29 (for purposes of McCarran-Ferguson Act, insurance involves investment risk-
taking and, hence, more companies may be exempt); Casenote, Sex Discrimination-Pensions-The
Court Takes a Stand, Arizona v. Norris, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 1329, 1342 (1984) (Congress left regu-
lation of insurance to states under McCarran-Ferguson Act).
26. The plan in Manhart was a defined contribution plan. See supra notes 13-14.
27. The Court also decided this issue in Norris. 463 U.S. at 1081-82. See also J. MAMORSKY,
supra note 3, § 11.03[3][a].
28. Although the Court ostensibly decided this issue in Norris, the holdings were confusing to
lower courts. See, eg., Long v. Florida, 805 F.2d 1542, 1551 (11th Cir. 1986) (denial of rehearing)
(retirees were entitled to retroactive relief dating to Manhart); Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity
Ass'n, 735 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1984) (awarding retroactive relief after Norris); Graham v. State of
N.Y., Dept. of Civil Serv., 664 F. Supp. 166, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Manhart put the plan's adminis-
trators on notice and, therefore, retroactive relief is appropriate); J. MAMORSKY, supra note 3,
§ 11.03[3][a] (only prospective relief is appropriate after Norris); Casenote, supra note 25, at 1347
("grave consequences of retroactive relief" outweigh benefits of such relief).
29. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (per curiam).
30. Id. at 1076-77. The other payment options, e.g., a lump sum payment or periodic payments
of a fixed sum for a fixed period, did not take sex into account but were less attractive from tax and
risk standpoints. Id.
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larly situated men received lower monthly payments."1
The Norris Court held that "the classification of employees on the ba-
sis of sex is no more permissible at the pay-out stage of a retirement plan
than at the pay-in stage."3 2 In short, the Court extended the rationale of
Manhart-an unequal contribution case-to Norris. In a three-step ra-
tionale, the Court rejected the employer's attempts to distinguish its plan
from the plan in Manhart.
The Court first found irrelevant the fact that some of the payment
options were nondiscriminatory: "[a]n employer that offers one fringe
benefit on a discriminatory basis cannot escape liability because he also
offers other benefits on a nondiscriminatory basis."33 The Court then
rejected any distinction on the basis of the third party insurers' participa-
tion in the plan, because the employer handpicked the companies and
entered into contracts with each participant. Having done so, reasoned
the Court, the employer was responsible for any discriminatory provi-
sions in the contracts.3 4 Finally, the Court rejected any reliance on the
McCarran-Ferguson Act as an exemption for the employer's conduct,
because plaintiffs were challenging an "employment practice" and not
"the business of insurance." 35
As in Manhart, the Court in Norris ordered only prospective relief.3 6
The District Court ordered that future annuity payments to female retir-
ees be made equal to payments received by similarly situated men.37 The
Court emphasized in a footnote that such relief is "fundamentally retro-
active in nature" because annuity payments are funded by the employee's
past contributions.38 Furthermore, the Court noted that "the State of
Arizona would be required to fund retroactively the deficiency in past
contributions made by its women retirees" in order to comply with the
31. Id. at 1077.
32. Id. at 1081. Justice Marshall authored the liability portion of the opinion and was joined by
Justices Brennan, White, Stevens, and O'Connor (the "swing vote").
33. Id. at 1081 n.10.
34. Id. at 1088-91.
35. Id. at 1087 n.17.
36. Id. at 1105-07. On the relief issue, Justice Powell authored the Court's opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice Powell, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, dissented from the finding of liability
under the statute. Id. at 1095-05. Justice O'Connor, whose swing vote created the majority on both
the liability and relief issues, wrote a concurring opinion which clarified her position. Id. at 1107-09
(liability), 1109-11 (relief).
37. Id. at 1105.
38. Id. at 1105 n.10.
19891
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District Court's order.39 Given the devastating financial impact such an
order would impose on the state, the Court denied retroactive relief.'
Norris clearly decided the liability issue and held that paying "a retired
woman lower monthly benefits than a man who deferred the same
amount of compensation" discriminates on the basis of sex and therefore
violates Title VII.1' However, even though many courts and commenta-
tors believed that Norris decided the retroactivity issue,42 lower courts
continued to exhibit some confusion. 3
Florida v. Long' ties up many, if not all, of the loose ends left in
Norris' wake. The Florida system challenged in Long was a noncontribu-
tory, defined benefit pension plan which guarantees a minimum level of
benefits upon retirement.45 Retirees may choose either a single life pay-
ment plan, with monthly benefits based on the employee's average
monthly compensation and years of service, or one of three joint annui-
ties based on the employee's life expectancy. The single life plan pays
equal benefits to similarly situated men and women. Prior to Norris,
however, the present values of the joint annuities were derived from sex-
based actuarial tables.4 Because women, on average, live longer than
men, the present value of their annuities and, therefore, the monthly pay-
ments, were greater than those received by similarly situated men. As a
result of this disparity, a class of pre-Norris male retirees, who chose an-
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1106. Justice O'Connor, concurring, offered a clearer explanation of the appropriate
relief:
I would require employers to ensure that benefits derived from contributions collected after
the effective date of our judgment be calculated without regard to the sex of the employee.
For contributions collected before the effective date of our judgment, however, I would
allow employers and participatory insurers to calculate the resulting benefits as they have
in the past.
I[d. at II11.
41. Id. at 1079.
42. Probe v. State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 1986) (no retroactive
relief awarded); Retired Public Employees' Ass'n v. State of Cal., 799 F.2d 511, 516 (9th Cir. 1986)
(no retroactive relief to Manhart allowed).
43. See supra note 28. "Moreover, since the Supreme Court's decision in Norris, the courts
have continued to struggle with the issue of retroactivity... ." J. MAMORSKY, supra note 3, at 11-
33.
44. 108 S. Ct. 2354 (1988).
45. Id. at 2357.
46. Id. at 2358. In fact, the Florida Constitution requires the state to fund the system on a
"sound actuarial basis." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 14. Because real differences exist between women
and men in terms of life expectancy, sex-based actuarial tables are unquestionably sound. See Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1977).
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nuity options, challenged the system under Title VII. The district court
granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and awarded retro-
active relief. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.47
In reversing the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court focused on two
retroactivity issues. Specifically, whether Manhart or Norris apprised
employers of the illegality of unequal benefits for male and female retir-
ees, and whether the plaintiffs were entitled to an increase in future bene-
fits.48 In the process, the Court applied a tripartite analysis, based on the
criteria identified in Chevron Oil Co. v. Hudson,49 to determine whether
retroactive relief should be awarded.
First, the Court considered "whether Manhart clearly defined the em-
ployer's obligations under Title VII with respect to benefit payments."50
The Court found that, although its decision in Manhart may have "sug-
gested the potential application of Title VII to unequal payments," the
majority carefully limited its holding to unequal contributions.51 The
Court also noted that Manhart left the open market exception issue un-
answered and that courts and commentators differed over the scope of
Manhart 2 The Court concluded that not until Norris did the Court
clearly extend the nondiscrimination principle to unequal benefits.
Therefore, Florida could well have assumed that its pension plan was
legal in the post-Manhart, pre-Norris period. 3 The Court held "that
Norris, and not Manhart, provides the appropriate date for determining
liability and relief."'54
47. Long, 108 S. Ct. at 2358-59. The award featured two elements: the retroactive "topping
up" of the males' retirement benefits prior to Norris and an increase in future monthly benefits. Id.
These increases "compensate [ ] for the difference between the benefits male retirees did receive and
the benefits they would have received if the Florida System had used unisex mortality tables ......
Id. at 2358 n.2.
48. Id. at 2357-58.
49. 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) (non-Title VII suit).
50. Long, 108 S. Ct. at 2359.
51. Id. at 2360.
52. Id. See supra note 17 and accompanying text for discussion of the open market exception.
See also supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflicting views of the
Manhart decision.
53. Long, 108 S. Ct. at 2360-61. The partial dissent, written by Justice Blackmun (Justices
Brennan and Marshall, joining) disagrees with the majority's restrictive reading ofManhart. Black-
mun argues that Manhart laid down a general principle, i.e., that use of sex-based actuarial tables in
a pension plan violates Title VII, and that no real distinction exists between unequal contribution
and unequal benefits cases. Id. at 2366. Apparently, the dissent would argue that a limited holding
does not restrict the underlying principle of law, whereas the majority views the holding and princi-
ple of law as coextensive.
54. Id. at 2362.
1989]
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In its discussion of the second Chevron criterion, whether retroactive
awards are necessary to further the purposes of Title VII and to ensure
compliance,55 the Court noted that Florida immediately switched to
unisex tables after Norris. Moreover, there was no evidence that employ-
ers in general had not complied with Title VII as interpreted in Manhart
and Norris. 6 Therefore, a retroactive award would not serve any deter-
rent function. The third Chevron criterion focuses on whether retroac-
tive liability will produce inequitable results for states, employers,
retirees, and pension funds. 7 On this count, the Court emphasized that
retroactive awards "would impose financial costs that would threaten the
security of both the funds and their beneficiaries."5" Because Florida
lacked notice, until Norris, that its system was unlawful, the Court felt
that such a financial burden would be inequitable. Consequently, the
Court held retroactive relief to be inappropriate for a class of male em-
ployees retiring pre-Norris.9
The Long Court is correct because it recognized that, although Man-
hart could be expanded to apply to payments of unequal benefits, the
Manhart holding was expressly limited to unequal contributions. This
limitation led to confusion among courts and commentators as to the
exact requirements of Manhart.
In the second part of its opinion, the Court considered implementation
of its nonretroactivity determination. 0 The Court found that the first
component of the district court's award-compensatory back payments
for the post-Manhart, pre-Norris period-was clearly retroactive in na-
ture and, therefore, disallowed. More importantly, the Court rejected
the lower courts' characterization of the second component-increased
future benefits-as prospective.61 The Court held that future "topping
up" is fundamentally retroactive because it "disrupt[s] past pension fund-
ing assumptions" and contributions by the employer. 2 The Court ex-
pressed concern that the increased benefits might cause a deficiency in
the pension fund, requiring additional contributions by the state or forc-
ing the plan to violate its minimum benefit guarantee to other retirees.
55. Id. at 2362.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2363.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2364.
[Vol. 67:643
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As a result, the Court refused to allow the increase in future benefits.63
The Court's reasoning with respect to the retroactivity issue is also
correct because it recognizes the "essential assumptions of an actuarially
funded pension plan."'  The Court accounted for the peculiar nature
and rules of pension plans.6" While the Court did not specifically address
ERISA's full funding requirements,66 ERISA further supports the
Court's analysis of the impact a retroactive award would have on pension
plans.67 In addition, many state constitutions and statutes place certain
restrictions and demands on pension plans.6" The Court correctly recog-
nized the severe impact that a retroactive award would have on pension
plans,69 combined this impact with the uncertainty left by Manhart,7 °
and used its equitable power to deny any retroactive relief.71
Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed
with the majority that the district court's order was retroactive.72 De-
spite this agreement, he concluded that the "unlawfulness of Florida's
pension plan was 'clearly foreshadowed' by [the Court's] decision in
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. For example, in a defined benefit plan, the employee's retirement benefit is calculated ac-
cording to a predetermined formula. The employer's yearly contribution is the amount needed to
provide this benefit. The yearly employer contribution is calculated based on actuarial assumptions
about future earnings of the fund, mortality, wage and salary scales, and turnover, age and sex of the
employees. G. BOREN, supra note 12, §§ 1:16 & 8:02. J. MAMORSKY, supra note 3, § 8.03, at 8-6.
See also Hager & Zimpleman, supra note 12, at 934. Increasing male or female benefits would
clearly require a retroactive adjustment of this formula.
66. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) imposes substantive re-
quirements on pension plans administered by employers. These substantive requirements apply
whether or not the plan is qualified under the Internal Revenue Code for tax purposes. ERISA
§§ 101-306 (29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1086 (1982)). These same substantive provisions also include mini-
mum vesting schedules, minimum participation requirements, and minimum funding requirements.
67. ERISA prescribes that each year an employer must contribute, at a minimum, the present
value of the pension liability accruing from an employee's current service ("normal cost") plus an
amount to amortize other costs. These other costs include losses resulting from changes in actuarial
assumptions. ERISA § 302 (29 U.S.C. § 1082 (1982)); see G. BOREN, supra note 12, § 9:01; J.
MAMORSKY, supra note 3, § 8.04. A change from sex-based to sex-neutral actuarial tables is an
unanticipated change in actuarial assumptions that creates the need for additional funding. The
result is a necessity for retroactive funding.
68. For example, Florida's constitution requires the state to collect contributions sufficient to
fund its retirement plan on a "sound actuarial basis." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 14.
69. The Court in Norris noted that its holding applies to all employer-sponsored pension plans
and an award of retroactive relief would cost from $817 to $1,260 million annually for the next 15 to
30 years. Norris, 463 U.S. at 1106.
70. See supra note 21-28 and accompanying text.
71. 108 S. Ct. at 2364.
72. Id. at 2365 n.2.
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Manhart, and did not depend on a 'new principle of law' announced in
Norris;" therefore, retroactive liability would be equitable.73 However,
Blackmun chose to ignore the fact that Manhart was viewed by courts
and commentators as merely raising the issue rather than actually decid-
ing the issue.74
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, concluded that pre-Manhart re-
tirees were entitled to unisex-based pension payments from the effective
date of Manhart.75 Stevens compared a pension case to a salary case and
concluded that they are indistinguishable: "each month's disparate re-
tirement check constitutes a separate violation" of Title VII.76 Stevens
ignored the Court's conclusions in both Manhart and Norris that the pre-
sumption in favor of retroactive liability can be overcome. 77 More im-
portantly, Stevens failed to appreciate the distinctions between
actuarially funded pension plans which are presently funded in order to
pay estimated future benefits,78 and payments of salaries which are paid
and accrued in the same period.79
Florida v. Long clarifies what constitutes "retroactive relief" in the
context of pension plans and further clarifies when and how relief is to be
implemented in pension plan suits. The majority clearly understood the
economics of an actuarially funded pension system and the devastating
impact an award of retroactive relief would have on the nation's funds.
The Court, in a well reasoned opinion, reached an acceptable conclusion
and provided needed predictability in the law of Title VII pension cases.
Linda K. Baxter
73. Id. at 2368.
74. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
75. Long, 108 S. Ct. at 2368.
76. Id.
77. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 723; Norris, 463 U.S. at 1105-07.
78. See supra notes 14, 65 and 67.
79. As one commentator noted, "Justice Stevens misunderstood the economics of pension bene-
fits and exhibited considerable naivet6." Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in Em-
ployee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CHi. L. Rlv. 489, 542 (1982).
[Vol. 67:643
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